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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW York. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7776 
COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS. LOCAL 1. AFSA. 
AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7864 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS. LOCAL 891. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7868 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
LOCAL 2. AFT, AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
Board - U-7776. U-7864. U-7868. U-7943 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7943 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37. AFSCME. 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS P. RYAN. ESQ. (RAYMOND F. O'BRIEN. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BRUCE K. BRYANT, ESQ.. for Charging Party, Council 
of Supervisors and Administrators, Local 1, AFSA, 
AFL-CIO 
VLADECK. WALDMAN. ELIAS & ENGELHARD. P.C. (MARIAN 
KENNEDY. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party, 
International Union of Operating Engineers. 
Local 891 
JAMES R. SANDNER. ESQ. (J. CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party, United Federation 
of Teachers. Local 2. AFT. AFL-CIO 
MARY E. MORIARTY, ESQ., for Charging Party. District 
Council 37. AFSCME 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charges herein were filed by four employee 
organizations, each of which represents one or more units of 
employees of the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District). Each of the 
charges complains that the District acted in violation of 
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§209-a.l of the Taylor Law in that it unilaterally imposed 
certain financial disclosure and background reporting 
obligations upon unit employees and that it refused to accede 
to demands of the employee organizations to negotiate the 
matter. The Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) assigned to the 
four cases found merit in some aspects of each charge, but no 
merit in other aspects of them. Each of the matters now 
comes to us on the exceptions of the charging parties and of 
the District. Because most of the material facts are common 
to all four cases, as are the more important legal issues, we 
consolidate them for decision. 
FACTS 
After a scandal in the spring of 1984 involving alleged 
financial improprieties by its then Chancellor, the District 
undertook to compel its higher-paid employees to complete and 
file extensive background investigation questionnaires and 
financial report forms. It did so under the authority of 
subdivision 13 and 14 of §2590-g of the Education Law, which 
were enacted nine years earlier by Chapter 810 of the Laws of 
1975.V-
At a meeting held on June 20, 1984, the District's Board 
of Education considered two resolutions dealing with these 
matters. They were Resolution 35 and Resolution 26. 
i/The text of that statute may be found in Appendix A. 
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2/ Resolution 35 was adopted at that meeting.- It is 
entitled "Authorization for Investigations by the City 
Department of Investigation of Background of Personnel 
Appointed or Promoted to Certain Job Titles and Positions." 
It provides for background investigations of the officers and 
employees of the Districtholding27differLe-n-t—t-i-ties-i—Of 
these, three—acting pedagogical employees, managerial 
3/ 
employees— and Civil Service provisionals—were to be 
covered only if their salaries should exceed an amount to be 
determined subsequently. The nature of the background 
investigation was also to be determined subsequently by the 
Board of Education or the Chancellor. 
On December 11. 1984. the Chancellor issued Regulation 
C-115 which effectuated Resolution 35 of June 20. 1984. The 
regulation is a six-page document with five multipage 
appendices. It specifies that acting pedagogical employees, 
managerial employees and Civil Service provisional employees 
would be subject to it only if they were compensated at or 
above $27,750 a year. It requires all covered employees to 
i/The text of Resolution 35 may be found in Appendix B. 
1/The reference to managerial employees does not 
contemplate persons who are designated managerial pursuant to 
§201.7 of the Taylor Law. Rather, it means exempt and 
noncompetitive employees who are paid in accordance with the 
District's managerial pay plan above the managerial level I 
salary. 
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complete and file a background investigation questionnaire 
which constitutes Appendix A to the regulation. That 
questionnaire consists of 18 pages of questions. The 
information sought falls into the following 13 categories: 
1) personal data; 2) residence record; 3) family record; 
A) m i l i t a r y s e r v i e e _ r ^ ^ ^ ^ 6 ) licenses, 
certifications; 7) employment; 8) spouses and dependents; 9) 
financial information; 10) tax information; 11) court record; 
12) health; 13) miscellaneous. The material relating to 
financial information runs six pages and contains ten 
multipart questions. 
Resolution 26. entitled "Regulation to Require Filing of 
Financial Disclosure Forms", was tabled until the Board of 
Education's July 3. 1984 meeting and it was adopted at that 
4/ time.— Its coverage was the same as that of Resolution 35 
until the Board of Education amended it on October 4, 
5/ 
1984.— Dealing only with coverage of the three titles for 
which a minimum salary is a condition for application of 
Resolution 26. the most significant change is that it 
extended its application to permanent Civil Service employees 
whose earnings satisfied the monetary figure. 
A/The text of Resolution 26 may be found in Appendix C. 
H/The text of that amendment may be found in Appendix D. 
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Like Resolution 35. Resolution 26 requires 
implementation by the Board of Education or the Chancellor, 
but. unlike Resolution 35, it specifies some financial 
information that is required of covered employees. 
On the same day as the Board of Education amended the 
resolution- the Chancel;ior—issued Regulatidn-e—120 which 
effectuated it. This regulation, too, is a six-page document 
and is accompanied by two multipage appendices. It indicates 
that those titles for which a salary minimum is a condition 
for its application must be remunerated at or above $42,000 
per year. The questionnaire, which is Appendix B to the 
regulation, is a 16-page document. 
The contents of Resolutions 26 and 35 were included in a 
calendar for the Board of Education meeting of June 20, 1984 
which was mailed to interested individuals and groups, 
including the four charging parties, on June 15, 1984. The 
calendar was a 42-page document containing 53 resolutions. 
After the meeting, minutes were mailed to most of the same 
individuals and groups. The minutes show the action of the 
Board of Education merely by cross-referencing to the 
resolution numbers on the calendar. 
The language of Resolution 26 shows up again on the 
calendar for the July 3. 1984 meeting as the first laid-over 
matter. That calendar, too, was mailed to the charging 
parties. The minutes of the meeting, which were mailed on 
June 22. 1984. show "LO-1 - Approved Unanimously." 
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The record does not show whether the Council of 
Supervisors and Administrators, Local 1, AFSA. AFL-CIO (CSA) 
and the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 891 
(IUOE) actually received the minutes of the two meetings. It 
shows that the United Federation of Teachers. Local 2. AFT, 
AFL—GIO (UFT-) did receive—them—shortly—a f-ter^ tftey—we re-sentry 
It also shows that a representative of District Council 37, 
AFSCME (DC-37) attended the Board of Education meetings on 
June 20 and July 3 and that he participated in the discussion 
on the resolutions. 
CSA and UFT had been parties to collective bargaining 
agreements with the District when Resolutions 26 and 35 were 
adopted, but the agreements had expired before the 
Chancellor's regulations were issued. UFT's agreement 
expired on September 9, 1984 and CSA's on September 30, 
1984. Neither agreement dealt explicitly with financial 
disclosure and background reporting obligations by unit 
employees. Both, however, contain clauses dealing with 
matters not otherwise covered by the agreement. Both provide 
that, with respect to such matters that are "proper subjects 
for collective bargaining," the District will make no change 
without appropriate negotiations. 
On October 4, 1984, CSA demanded negotiations on the 
subject of the financial disclosure and background reporting 
obligations of the employees in its negotiating unit, and on 
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the impact of the District's unilateral action on those 
employees. The District refused to negotiate these demands 
and CSA filed its charge (U-7776) on October 22. 1984. 
Dealing with both C-115 and C-120. the charge contends that 
the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law in that 
i t engaged in uni lateral action-wdth respect-to a—master that— 
it was obligated to negotiate, it refused a demand to 
negotiate the financial disclosure and background reporting 
obligations, and it refused to negotiate the impact of its 
unilateral action. CSA also charged that the District 
violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law in that it did not 
continue the terms of the expired agreement which required 
the maintenance of the status quo with respect to "proper 
subjects of collective bargaining." 
IUOE filed its charge (U-7864) on December 6. 1984. It. 
too. alleged a violation of §209-a.l(d). but it alleged no 
6 / 
violation of §209-a.1(e).— Like CSA. IUOE complains about 
both C-115 and C-120. The complaint, however, merely deals 
£/lUOE also alleged a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the 
Taylor Law. The ALJ found no violation on the ground that 
there was no evidence of improper motivation. The issue is 
not before us as there are no exceptions to this 
determination. 
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^ 7 / 
with the District's unilateral action.— 
UFT filed its charge (U-7868) on December 14, 1984. Like 
CSA. it complains about a violation of §209-a.l(d) and (e) of 
the Taylor Law. The alleged (e) violation is the same as that 
specified by CSA. The alleged (d) violation, like that 
s p e c j _ f _ j_ e d by—IUOE^ i s 1 imited to -1he D i s t r i c t ' s u m t a t e r a 1 8 / 
action.— UFT's charge is limited to Chancellor's 
Regulation C-115. C-120 does not apply to employees in its 
negotiating unit because none meets the salary threshold of 
$42,000. 
The final charge (U-7943) was filed by DC-37. DC-37 
filed its charge on January 18, 1985. Dealing with both C-115 
9/ 
and C-120. it complains about a violation of §209-a.1(d).— 
The first enumerated paragraph of the charge states that on or 
about October 30. 1984. the District notified it that it 
"would begin unilaterally on November 5, 1984 conducting 
Z/iuOE made a demand to negotiate on January 17. 1985. 
which the District refused on January 25, 1985. These events 
occurred after the charge was filed and the charge was not 
amended to complain about this refusal. 
^-/originally, the charge complained about a refusal to 
negotiate. This complaint was withdrawn when UFT was unable 
to establish that it had ever made a demand to negotiate. 
2/Like IUOE, DC-37 also alleged a violation of 
§209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. Here, too, the ALJ found no 
violation on the ground that there was no evidence of 
improper motivation and there are no exceptions to this 
determination. 
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interviews and would require completed detailed personal and 
financial disclosure forms of selected Board of Education 
employees represented by the charging party." The charge 
further alleges that, on November 20, 1984, DC-37 "requested a 
labor-management meeting to discuss, negotiate and bargain over 
the—implementation-of the—investigation—procedure " JLt 
continues: "On December 13, 1984, there was a meeting 
held . . . to discuss the union's proposal to bargain over the 
investigation, interviews and disclosure forms." On December 
26. 1984. DC-37 informed the District of its specific 
objections to the actions taken by the District. The District 
responded on January 10, 1985 that it would not negotiate 
DC-371s proposals. 
At the pre-hearing conference held on March 12, 1985. 
DC-37 moved to amend its charge and the ALJ granted the 
motion. The details of the amendment were put in writing by 
DC-37 on March 13. 1985; its letter indicates that the 
amendment was intended "to clarify that the charge alleges both 
'a unilateral change' and 'a refusal to bargain upon demand.'" 
The District's answers to the four charges all question 
the jurisdiction of this Board over the subject matter of the 
charges and their timeliness. Dealing with the merits, the 
answers assert that the District's actions involved 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation and were therefore not 
subject to any bargaining obligation. 
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The ALJs concluded that this Board has jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of the charges and found them all timely. 
They determined that, by reason of the language of Education 
Law §2590-g.l3 and .14, the District's decision to seek some 
of the information and the procedure it adopted to solicit 
that information constituted—a management prerogative.__T_o__ 
that extent, they dismissed the §209-a.l(d) specifications. 
They ruled that other aspects of the District's conduct were 
subject to a bargaining obligation and. to that extent, it 
was in violation of §209-a.l(d). They also found that the 
District violated §209-a.l(e) to the extent that its 
treatment of employees represented by CSA and UFT involved 
mandatory subjects of negotiation.— 
Notwithstanding their determinations that certain 
aspects of the reporting obligations should have been 
negotiated, while other aspects of them need not have been, 
the ALJs found that the questionnaires were integrated 
iO/ln doing so. one of the ALJs found the contract 
language "proper subjects for collective bargaining" to 
mean mandatory subjects of negotiation and concluded that 
it did not require maintenance of the status quo with 
respect to nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. The other 
ALJ concluded that other than proper subjects could mean 
either prohibited subjects, or nonmandatory but permissive 
subjects of negotiation. Finding no. evidence supporting 
either interpretation, he ruled that the burden of 
establishing the meaning of the clause fell upon the 
charging party, and he. too. treated the language as if it 
meant mandatory subjects of negotiation. Both, therefore, 
declined to find a violation of §209-a.l(e) by virtue of 
changes in other then mandatory subjects. 
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documents. They concluded that it would be impractical to 
attempt a remedy which left a part of the questionnaires 
intact. Accordingly, they ordered the destruction of the 
completed questionnaires in toto. 
The matters come to us on the exceptions of all the 
parties^ Dealing-with the^  juTis^dict^ 
contends that the charges raise issues of public policy and 
statutory interpretation that may be resolved only in the 
courts. It also contends that with respect to CSA and UFT. 
its conduct could not constitute more than contract 
violations because the collective bargaining agreements did 
not expire until after the adoption of Resolutions 35 and 
26. The District argues that the ALJs erred in finding the 
charges to be timely insofar as they complain about 
unilateral action affecting provisional employees. It 
contends that the time to file charges complaining about such 
conduct ran from the date when charging parties knew or 
should have known of its adoption of Resolutions 35 and 
ii^The District acknowledges that the time to file 
charges regarding the unilateral action affecting permanent 
employees ran from the amendment of Resolution 26 on 
October 10, 1984. Even this date, however, is more than 
four months prior to the amendment of DC-37's charge. The 
District also acknowledges that the time to file charges 
complaining about its refusal to negotiate on demand runs 
from the date of the refusal. 
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Directing its attention to the specific objections to 
some of its actions which DC-37 interposed on December 13, 
1984, the District argues that this constituted a waiver of 
DC-37's right to contest its authority to require unit 
employees to participate in the investigations. 
Both^theDistrict— and the charging parties—have—filed 
exceptions to the decisions of the ALJs insofar as they find 
some aspects of the District's conduct to involve management 
prerogatives. Each contends that the ALJs1 decisions are in 
error to the extent that they were adverse to them. CSA and 
UFT also except to the failure of the ALJs to hold that the 
contract language "proper subjects for collective bargaining" 
extends to permissive subjects of negotiation. 
Finally, the District's exceptions complain about the 
remedial order. Assuming arguendo that certain aspects of 
the reporting obligations should have been negotiated, while 
other aspects need not have been, it contends that a remedial 
order could have been tailored to this circumstance. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The primary argument of the District on jurisdiction 
appears to be that this Board cannot consider the charges 
because they complain about unilateral conduct involving 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. Whether or not the 
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District's conduct involves mandatory subjects of negotiation 
requires an analysis of public policy and the Education Law 
which, the District argues, lies within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts. Elsewhere, however, the District 
appears to concede that this Board can interpret public 
policy or-a statute—to~the^^extent Tiecesscixy ^to determrne 
whether something is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
The latter is a correct statement of the law. This 
Board may and, on occasion, is required to interpret public 
12/ 13/ 
policy,— State statutes other than the Taylor Law,— 
14/ 
and, on occasion, even Federal statutes— in order to 
ascertain whether something is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. Accordingly, this Board has subject matter 
jurisdiction over the charges to the extent necessary to 
ascertain whether the District's unilateral action and 
refusal to negotiate involve mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. Insofar as they do. this Board is empowered to 
find violations and to issue remedial orders. Insofar as 
12/See. e.g., Plainveiw-Old Bethpage CSD. 17 PERB 
ir3077 (1984), aff 'd. Plainview-Old Bethpage Chairpersons' 
Ass'n v. PERB. 17 PERB ir7022 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1984). 
11/See. e.g., City of Binghamton. 9 PERB 1f3026 
(1976), aff'd. City of Binghamton v. Helsbv. 9 PERB 1F7019 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1976). 
ii/see, e.g.. PBA of Newburgh. 18 PERB 1P065 (1985), 
aff'd. City of Newburgh v. Newman. 19 PERB T7005 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany Co. 1986).' 
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they do not, we exercise no jurisdiction over the District's 
conduct even if it is violative of public policy and statutes 
15/ 
other than the Taylor Law. 
A secondary jurisdictional issue is related to the 
question of timeliness. If the operative conduct of the 
District occurred during the life of its collective bargaining 
agreements with CSA and UFT, it might be argued that such 
unilateral conduct merely constituted a violation of contract 
and not of statute. We reject this challenge to our 
jurisdiction for the same reason that we find the charges 
16/ timely, infra;— the operative conduct occurred after the 
expiration of the agreements. 
B. Timeliness. 
As noted above, there is no question but that the charges 
are timely insofar as they allege a refusal to negotiate 
UL/of course, the matter would fall within the 
jurisdiction of this Board if the conduct were improperly 
motivated and therefore violative of §209-a.l(a) or (c) of 
the Taylor Law. 
16/In any event, we would find that the rights 
asserted by CSA and UFT flow from the Taylor Law rather 
than from the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
because the agreement does not deal with background and 
financial investigations directly and the status quo 
provisions are too remote from these subjects to constitute 
a waiver of the two employee organizations' negotiation 
rights. See CSEA v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB IROll 
(3d Dep't 1982), app. dism'd, 57 N.Y.2d 775, 15 PERB ir7020 
(1982); City of Pouqhkeepsie v. Newman, 95 AD2d 101, 16 
PERB ir7021 (3d Dep't 1983), app. dism'd, 60 NY2d 859, 16 
PERB ir7027 (1983) . 
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specific demands. It is equally clear that the charge is 
timely with respect to unilateral action involving permanent 
employees. We affirm the decisions of the ALJs that the 
charge is also timely with respect to the unilateral action 
directed at provisional employees. 
Resolution—26i and—especially Resolution 35v were not- — 
sufficiently complete to inform the charging parties as to 
what disclosures were required of covered employees. 
Moreover, the resolutions did not disclose which employees 
17/ 
were covered.— We have held that work rules designed to 
protect public employers against theft and corruption may or 
may not be mandatory subjects of negotiation depending upon 
the intrusiveness of the work rules upon the public employees 
and the interests that those work rules protect. In applying 
this balancing test, we indicated that relatively subtle 
distinctions in the intrusiveness of the work rules and the 
public interest to which they are directed may lead to our 
finding that some are mandatory subjects of negotiation while 
18/ 
other similar rules would not be.— The issuance of 
regulations C-115 and C-120 changed the obligations of unit 
employees in more than subtle ways. Neither Resolution 26 
IZ/E.g.. until the issuance of Regulations C-115 and 
C-120. UFT did not know that its unit employees had reason 
to be concerned about Resolution 35. but not Resolution 26. 
IJ/compare State of New York. 18 PERB V3064 (1985), 
with Rensselaer County. 13 PERB 1f3080 (1980). 
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"A. 
nor 35 is susceptible to ministerial enforcement. If the 
District is to impose its investigative procedures upon unit 
employees, it must rely upon the regulations. Accordingly, 
these were the definitive acts imposing identifiable 
. . 19/ 
reporting requirements upon identifiable employees. 
There is a second reason why the charges filed by CSA, 
IUOE and UFT are timely. Although they may have been sent 
copies of the calendars and minutes of the meetings of the 
20/ 
Board of Education of June 20 and July 3, 1984,— this was 
not sufficient to give them constructive notice of the 
adoption of and the contents of the resolutions. To gain 
such knowledge, the employee organizations would have had to 
) review the extensive calendars and then to match the 
resolution numbers against the adoption numbers that appeared 
in separate documents some weeks later. It would be 
unreasonable to hold them accountable for constructive notice 
21/ 
under these circumstances.— Thus, if time to file 
UL/lt is from the time that it has actual or 
constructive knowledge of the definitive acts of the 
employer that a party aggrieved has four months to file a 
timely charge. Monroe County, 10 PERB ir3104 (1977); Board 
of Education of the New York City School District, 12 PERB 
ir3070 (1979). 
^°-/The record only shows that UFT received those 
documents. 
ll/compare County of Ulster, 14 PERB 1P008 (1981). 
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charges were to run from the adoption of the resolutions, 
only DC-37 would be time barred because it alone had actual 
knowledge of such adoption. 
The final timeliness issue relates to DC-37's amendment 
of its charge on March 12 to "clarify" that it alleges both 
"a-^unilateral-change "and-JI-a—refusal to-bargain upon 
demand." The District argues that the amendment constituted 
more than a clarification of the charge in that it added a 
unilateral change specification when there was none in the 
original charge. Were this so, we would find the 
specification untimely because the amendment was made more 
than four months after DC-37 had notice of the District's 
unilateral action. However, we agree with the ALJ that the 
unilateral change specification was contained in the original 
charge. In complaining that the District violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. DC-37 alleged facts 
constituting both a unilateral action and a refusal to 
bargain upon demand. 
C. Waiver. 
The District contends that DC-37 "admitted the Board of 
Education's right to conduct background investigations for 
unit employees" by making specific objections to some but not 
other actions taken by the District. This is not a 
reasonable interpretation of the conduct of DC-37. On 
November 20, 1984, DC-37 requested a meeting to "bargain over 
the implementation of the investigation procedure . . . ." 
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The District met with it on December 13, 1984 at which time 
DC-37 made negotiation proposals directed at some aspects of 
the District's procedure. We do not understand how an 
attempt to negotiate can be interpreted as a concession of no 
right to negotiate. 
D. The Merits. 
The proposition of the District is that the resolutions 
of its Board of Education and the regulations of its 
Chancellor involve management prerogatives. It bases this 
proposition both on a freestanding public policy that public 
employers must be vigilant in avoiding corruption and on 
specific mandates of Education Law §2590-g.l3 and .14. 
Certainly there is a public policy that public employers 
should avoid corruption. There are, however, two other 
public policies that must be considered. The first is the 
public policy that public employees enjoy rights of 
22/ 
privacy. The second is the public policy underlying the 
Taylor Law, that the State, local governments and other 
political subdivisions should negotiate with and enter into 
written agreements with recognized and certified public 
employees regarding the terms and conditions of employment of 
unit employees. In determining whether the District's 
conduct involved a mandatory subject of negotiation, we must 
IJ/Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157 (1978). 
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apply a balancing test that considers all three public 
policies. In doing so, we begin by reviewing the relevant 
court decisions. 
The first of these is Board of Education v. Associated 
Teachers of Huntington. 30 N.Y.2d 122, 7 PERB 1f7505 (1972). 
It holds that public employers must negotiate all terms and 
conditions of employment unless there is an explicit 
statutory prohibition. This broad holding was successively 
narrowed by two subsequent holdings of the Court of Appeals. 
In Syracuse Teachers Association v. Board of Education. 35 
N.Y.2d 743. 7 PERB ir7513 (1974), the Court indicated that 
plain and clear prohibitions in statutory or decisional law, 
as well as express statutory prohibitions, would preclude a 
bargaining obligation. Finally, in Susquehanna Valley CSD v. 
Teachers' Association. 37 N.Y.2d 614. 8 PERB ir7515 (1975), 
the Court indicated that the duty to negotiate might be 
limited not only by past statutory or decisional law but also 
23/ by matters of public policy.— 
23/Although not directly relevant to our holding 
here, the Susquehanna court reiterated the holding of West 
Irondequoit Teachers Association v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46. 7 
PERB 117014 (1974), that certain matters not subject to a 
bargaining obligation might, nevertheless, be permissive 
subjects of negotiation. 
We make this point here because the District's 
arguments imply that any matter which, by reason of public 
policy, is not a mandatory subject of negotiation is a 
prohibited subject of negotiation. 
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There are two important cases in which the courts voided 
aspects of collective bargaining agreements because they were 
against public policy. In Cohoes CSD v. Cohoes Teachers 
Association, 40 N.Y.2d 774. 9 PERB T7529 (1976). the Court 
ruled that a Board of Education could not surrender its right 
iro terminate a teacher at the- end ofhis or—her—probationary 
period. Thus, an agreement that appeared to do so was. to 
that extent, held to be inoperative. Similarly, in Board of 
Education. Great Neck v. Areman. 41 N.Y.2d 527. 10 PERB 1F7512 
(1977), the Court determined that the nondelegable 
responsibilities of a Board of Education prevented it from 
agreeing not to look at teachers' personnel files. A clause 
of a collective bargaining agreement which purported to do so 
was therefore voided. 
The test evolved by the Court of Appeals in 
Huntinqton-Syracuse-Susquehanna and applied in Cohoes and 
Great Neck is essentially similar to the one applied by this 
Board in scope of negotiation cases ever since New Rochelle. 
4 PERB 1P060 (1971). This Board engages in a balancing test 
in which the vital interests of government are measured 
against the intrusiveness of the public employer's actual or 
potential conduct upon the terms and conditions of employment 
of unit employees. This can be seen most relevantly in the 
distinction drawn by this Board between the circumstances in 
State of New York. 18 PERB 1P064 (1985). and Rensselaer 
County. 13 PERB 1[3080 (1980). In both cases, this Board 
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) recognized a public policy that governments should protect 
themselves against theft of their property by employees. We 
further recognized that governments could adopt work rules 
which imposed some burdens upon unit employees in the course 
of doing so. On the other hand, we recognized that those 
, burdens, if sufficient, would trigger the public employer's 
obligation to negotiate because there is also a public policy 
that disputes involving terms and conditions of employment 
should be resolved through collective negotiations. 
1. The Freestanding Public Policy. 
The District bases its argument, that there is a 
freestanding public policy that governments should protect 
themselves from corruption which is sufficient to insulate 
^ them from having to negotiate the procedures they undertake 
to do so. upon Evans v. Carey. 40 N.Y.2d 1008 (1976). and 
Hunter v. City of New York. 44 N.Y.2d 708 (1978). In neither 
case, however, is there any question of collective 
negotiations. The Evans decision merely holds that the 
State's interest in preventing corruption is supported by a 
public policy of sufficient gravity to overcome the privacy 
rights of individuals when the governor issues an otherwise 
valid order imposing a financial questionnaire. The Hunter 
decision applies this same principle to New York City. 
The District also cites a decision of the Second Circuit 
which holds that the provisions of Education Law §2590-g and 
Regulation C-120 are substantially related to an important 
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state interest to which the privacy claims of officials must 
yield. Kaplan v. Board of Education. 759 F.2d 256 (1985). 
That decision, too, did not consider collective bargaining 
rights, the officials involved not being in negotiating 
units. 
—- R-a-p-p—v—-Ga-r-e-y-r—-s-u-p-r-a-T -notcitedby—a-ny—o-f—tfa-e—pa-r-t-i-es-. 
is also relevant. It holds that, while governments can and 
ought to protect themselves against corruption. Governor 
Carey acted unconstitutionally when he imposed a reporting 
obligation by executive order. It indicated that such an 
obligation could be imposed unilaterally upon 
employees-at-will but. absent legislative authority, not upon 
tenured Civil Service employees or appointees with term 
appointments. Thus, absent legislation, the public policy of 
avoiding corruption is subordinate to the public policy of 
protecting the privacy rights of tenured public employees. 
This case, too, did not deal with the question of 
collective bargaining obligations. 
These decisions lead us to the conclusion that our 
analysis of State of New York, supra, and Rensselaer County. 
supra, is appropriate to the issue of freestanding public 
policy. The District's concern in this case is very similar 
to that of the public employers in those two cases. The 
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public concern in avoiding the conflicts of interest here is 
comparable to that of avoiding the theft in those cases. On 
the other hand, the District's actions are far more intrusive 
than the work rules imposed in State of New York and 
Rensselaer County. The questionnaires seek very personal 
information and are a greater invasion of privacy than the 
searches. We therefore hold that there is no freestanding 
public policy making the District's conduct a management 
prerogative. 
2. The Public Policy Implications of Education Law 
§2590-g.l3 and .14. 
Education Law §2590-g.l3 and .14 enumerates the powers 
and duties of the District's Board of Education. It 
contains 16 numbered paragraphs, all introduced by the 
sentence: "In addition the City Board shall have the power 
and duty to:". Insofar as the statute specifies powers of 
the District, it seems obvious that those powers are subject 
to mandatory negotiations to the extent that they involve 
terms and conditions of employment. Indeed, a public 
employer need not, and may not, negotiate demands that it 
take or refrain from taking actions where a statute or 
public policy deprives it of the power to do so. Such a 
contract would be void unless the power to take such action 
is denied the employer because it affects rights of 
employees which may be waived, in which event the matter 
10 
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24/ 
would be a permissive subject of negotiation. 
The proposition that the numbered paragraphs specify 
duties of the District raises a more serious problem. The 
plain meaning of the word would appear to be that the 
District must act pursuant to the statute. As the ALJs 
found, this has not been the District's understanding of the 
word. Subdivisions 13 and 14 were added to the law in 1975 
and the District took no action to implement them for 10 
years. 
An alternative reading of the word "duty" would be that 
it bestows upon the District a nondelegable responsibility. 
If this were so, it would establish a management prerogative 
25/ 
and a prohibited subject of negotiation. Finally, it 
2 6/ 
might be seen as a nonexclusive responsibility.— As 
there are no judicial interpretations of the word "duty", we 
must discern its meaning from the language of Education Law 
§2590-g.l3 and .14. 
Section 2590-g.l3 deals with business relationships 
between District personnel and the District. It is narrowly 
•i-i/city of Binqhamton. supra, fn. 13; Antinore v. 
State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 6, 8 PERB T7513 (4th Dep't, 
1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921, 9 PERB V7528 (1976). 
i^./Compare, Cohoes, supra, and Great Neck, supra. 
26,/section 207.1(c) of the Taylor Law recognizes 
that, in some areas, public employers and employee 
organizations have a joint responsibility to serve the 
public. 
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drawn. The only choices that this statute affords to the 
District are whether or not to prescribe regulations and. if 
so, to whom the regulations should apply. Once it exercises 
its discretion in these regards, the nature and extent of the 
business relations that must be disclosed are specified in the 
statute Accordingly, we hold that the—District-is _und.ej:_no 
duty to negotiate with the charging parties to the extent that 
it requires unit employees to report the details set forth in 
Education Law §2590-g.l3.a(l) and (2) provided, however, that 
such reports may be required unilaterally only upon the 
occurrence of a business relationship covered by that statute. 
Furthermore, the preemptive aspects of the statute persuade us 
that even as to those two areas in which the District was given 
discretion to act, there was a legislative intent that it act 
unilaterally. The situation presented by subdivision 13 is 
analagous to the situation considered by the Court of Appeals 
in Cohoes, supra and Great Neck, supra. The discretion 
extended to the public employer is nondelegable. 
To the extent that the District has unilaterally decided 
to solicit additional information relating to business 
relationships between unit employees or their families and it, 
it exceeded its authority under subdivision 13 and violated its 
duty to negotiate in good faith. Similarly, to the extent that 
it has rejected demands to negotiate such matters, or to 
negotiate the impact of its unilateral action, it has also 
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violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. In this 
connection, we note that the duty to negotiate extends to the 
impact of unilateral action involving nonmandatory subjects of 
27/ 
negotiation.— 
Section 2590-g.l4 deals with financial reports. This 
subdivisionis— much-less—spec-i-f-i-c than—subdivis-ton—1-3-iji-that— 
it encompasses a broader range of matters that may be covered 
by questionnaires. Moreover, while subdivision 13 makes no 
reference to the discretion of the District, subdivision 14 
expressly states that the District's Board of Education may 
require financial reports at its "discretion." 
As explained by the ALJ in U-7864, the reference to "good 
cause shown" has no relevance to the issue before us. The 
reference to discretion, however, is significant. Unlike the 
unmentioned and severely limited discretion afforded by 
subdivision 13. the discretion extended to the District by 
subdivision 14 is broad, extending to the substance of the 
reporting requirements. The focus of concern at the time when 
this statute was enacted was whether a public employer could, 
in its discretion, require financial reports from its employees 
without violating the public policy which protects their 
•iZ/West Irondeguoit Teachers Association v. Helsby. 
35 N.Y.2d 46. 7 PERB T7014 (1974); Baldwinsville CSD. 
15 PERB ir3032 (1982) . 
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privacy rights. In Evans v. Carey. Hunter v. City of New 
York and Rapp v. Carey, the Court of Appeals held that the 
public interest in having a public employer protect itself 
from corruption was sufficient for the question to be 
answered by a qualified yes. A public employer had such 
discretrion-Butr~onIy—wi^ iTfir^ fespeat: to employees ^ who had lib 
property interest in their jobs. For the public employer 
to be able to exercise that discretion by requiring 
reports from tenured employees, enabling legislation was 
required. Subdivision 14 is such a statute. The 
enactment of subdivision 14 therefore permitted the 
District to issue otherwise valid orders imposing 
financial questionnaire obligations upon its tenured 
employees. Whether or not such an order is otherwise 
valid, however, depends upon satisfying another public 
policy and statutory obligation, the duty to negotiate 
terms and conditions of employment. Once subdivision 14 
gave the District the discretion to take certain actions, 
those actions became part of its Taylor Law duty to 
negotiate in good faith. 
We find that the District violated that duty when it 
unilaterally imposed reporting requirements regarding the 
financial interests of unit employees and their spouses. 
We also find that it violated that duty by rejecting 
demands of the employee organizations to negotiate this 
1-0187. 
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28/ 
matter.— 
Having found that the components of the questionnaires 
are all either mandatory subjects of negotiation or 
prohibited subjects of negotiation involving nondelegable 
responsibilities of the District, it is unnecessary for us 
to determine whetherthe-language "proper^subjeets—of-
collective bargaining" means permissive subjects of 
29/ 
negotiation or prohibited subjects of negotiation.— 
At the very least, the "proper subjects" language in the 
CSA and UFT contracts covered mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. Accordingly, we find that the District 
violated §209-a.l(e) to the extent that it imposed 
reporting requirements upon employees represented by CSA 
and UFT that went beyond the business relationships 
covered by subdivision 13. 
•^^There are questions asked by the District that do 
not relate to business relationships with it or to the 
financial interests of the employees. For example, there 
are questions regarding the membership of employees in 
political parties and their military record. These 
questions are not authorized by Education Law §2590-g.l3 or 
.14. It may be that they intrude upon the privacy right of 
employees which are protected by Rapp v. Carey, supra. If 
so. the District cannot compel the charging parties to 
negotiate with respect to them (see City of Binghamton and 
Antinore. supra, fn. 24). This proposition was not 
addressed by any of the parties and need not be addressed 
by us here. This decision goes no further than to hold 
that the District may not ask such questions without first 
negotiating with the charging parties. 
^/Were we required to answer this question, we would 
find that CSA and UFT have not satisfied their burden of 
proof that the language contemplates both mandatory and 
permissive subjects of negotiation. 
10188 
Board - U-7776. U-7864. U-7868. U-7943 -30 
The final issue before us is the appropriateness of the 
remedy which did not distinguish between elements of the 
questionnaire involving mandatory subjects of negotiation 
and those involving nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
We disagree with the ALJs' determination that it is not 
_practicab:le_to^ dr.aw_SAacJh a distinct ion. As to thosjel 
questionnaires that have already been filed by unit 
employees, the District can retain the information specified 
in subdivision 13 while destroying the remaining 
information. For the future, however, the District should 
cease using the questionnaires and should devise new 
questionnaires soliciting only the information referred to 
in subdivision 13. The solicitation of other information 
shall be subject to collective negotiations with the 
charging parties. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the District to: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement or 
implementation of Chancellor's Regulations C-115 and 
C-120 and any questionnaires, forms, or other 
documents issued or interviews scheduled pursuant 
thereto; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all reports or other 
documents submitted by unit employees pursuant to 
Chancellor's Regulations C-115 or C-120 from any 
files kept or maintained by the District or any of 
its agents, provided, however, that the District may 
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retain information to the extent that such 
information is required pursuant to Education Law 
§2590-g.l3. 
3. Negotiate in good faith with CSA. IUOE. UFT and 
DC-37 with respect to the terms and conditions of 
employment of unit employees consistent with its 
duty under the Act; 
4. Continue all terms of the agreements with CSA and 
UFT which expired on September 30. 1984 and 
September 9, 1984 respectively until new agreements 
are negotiated; 
5. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations at which any affected unit employees work 
in places ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to such unit employees. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member Liyuc 
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NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
——•——- —^and -in-order-to effectuate the policies of t h e — — —— 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify a l l employees in the n e g o t i a t i n g u n i t s r e p r e s e n t e d by 
CSA, IUOE, UFT and~DC-37 t h a t we w i l l : 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement or implementation 
of Chancellor's Regulations C-115 and C-120 and any 
questionnaires, forms, or other documents issued or 
interviews scheduled pursuant thereto; 
2„ Immediately remove and destroy all reports or other 
documents submitted by unit employees pursuant to 
Chancellor's Regulations C-115 or C-120 from any files 
kept or maintained by us or any of our agents, provided, 
however, that we may retain information to the extent 
that such information is required pursuant to Education 
Law §2590-g,13;' 
3. Negotiate in good faith with CSA, IUOE, UFT and DC-37 
with respect to the terms and conditions of employment 
of unit employees consistent with our duty under the 
Act.; 
4„ Continue all terms of the agreements with CSA. and. UFT 
which expired on September 30, 1984 and September 9, 
1984 respectively until new agreements are negotiated„ 
•Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York 
APPENDIX A 
This statute provides that the District shall have the power 
and the duty to: 
13. a. Prescribe regulations and bylaws 
requiring members of the city board, the 
chancellor, and any other officer or employee in 
schools and programs under the jurisdiction of the 
city board and the chancellor, to make disclosure 
to the city board, within ninety days of the 
-effective-date hereof—for—the—one-y-e-a-r—per-iod 
preceding such effective date, and subsequent to 
such effective date upon the occurrence thereof, of 
the following information: 
(1) any direct or indirect interest of the 
person reporting or his or her spouse in the 
furnishing of any supplies or materials, or in the 
doing of any work or labor, including the provision 
of professional services, or in the sale or leasing 
of any real estate, or in any proposal, agreement 
or contract for any of these purposes, in any case 
in which the price or consideration is to be paid, 
in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, out of 
any public or school moneys, or any employment, 
labor, compensation, direct or indirect interest, 
membership or relationship to any individual, firm, 
company, corporation, business, organization or 
association doing business with the city of New 
York or the city school district of the city of New 
York. 
(2) the source of any income, reimbursement, 
gift or other form of compensation for services 
rendered together with a description of such 
services arising out of interest disclosed pursuant 
to paragraph (1) above. 
b. Regulations and bylaws authorized herein 
shall apply with equal force and effect to 
community board members, community superintendents 
and all other officers and employees in schools and 
programs under the jurisdiction of the community 
boards. 
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c. Willful failure to make full and timely 
disclosure shall constitute cause for removal from 
office of any member of the city board or for any 
other officer or employee disciplinary action and 
such other penalty as provided by law. 
14. a. Prescribe regulations and bylaws 
requiring members of the city board, the chancellor 
•and. for good cause shown, any other officer of 
employee-in -schools-and-pxogxams^under—the 
jurisdiction of the city board and the chancellor, 
to submit to the city board, in the discretion of 
the city board, financial reports for themselves 
and their spouses. 
b. The frequency and period of coverage, the 
designation of persons to submit such reports by 
name, title or income level or by a combination 
thereof, and the content of such reports, including 
minimum dollar amounts, shall be determined by the 
city board and such reports may include but not 
necessarily be limited to the following: 
(1) amount and source of income for services 
rendered, together with a description of such 
services; 
(2) amount and source of gifts, capital 
gains, reimbursements for expenditures, and 
honoraria; 
(3) investments in securities and real 
property; 
(4) amount of debts and names of creditors; 
(5) outstanding loans and other forms of 
indebtedness due to person reporting or spouse, by 
name and amounts; 
(6) trusts and other fiduciary relationships 
and their assets in which a beneficial interest is 
held. 
c. Regulations and bylaws authorized herein 
shall apply with equal force and effect to 
community board members, community superintendents 
and all other officers and employees in schools and 
programs under the jurisdiction of the community 
boards. 
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(d) Willful failure to file required 
financial reports shall constitute cause for 
removal from office of any member of the city board 
or for any other officer of employee disciplinary 
action and such other penalty as provided by law. 
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35. AUTHORIZATION FOR INVESTIGATIONS BY Till" CITY DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION Of BACKGROUND 
OF PERSONNEL APPOINTED OR PROMOTED TO CERTAIN JOB TITLES AND POSITIONS 
The following resolutions are presented for adoption: 
WHEREAS, New York State Education Law provides that the City Board shall have the 
power and duty to be the public employer of all persons appointed or assigned by the 
City Board and the Community School Boards and authorizes the City Board to prescribe 
such regulations and bylaws as may be necessary; and the Mayor has issued Executive 
Order #72 requiring background investigations for certain titles; now therefore be it 
RESOLVED, That a background, investigation by the City Department of Investigation be 
required for all persons employed in certain job titles or positions, as set forth 
below and for other positions at the discretion of the Board of Education or the 
Chancellor: • 
Member, Board of Education 
Secretary, Board of Education 
. - - Counsel to the Board of Education • . -. - -_:. ,_ 
Inspector General 
Legislative Representative 
Assistant Secretary, Board of Education 
Assistant to Board Member 
Chancellor 
Deputy Chancellor 
Chief Executive 
Assistants to the Chancellor 
Assistants to the Deputy Chancellor 
Assistants to t',\e Chief Executives 
Executive Director 
Community Superintendent 
Assistant Superintendent 
Deputy Executive Director 
Deputy Community Superintendent , 
Deputy Assistant Superintendent 
Administrative Assistant Superintendent 
Director 
Deputy Director 
Executive Assistant/Secretary to Community School Board 
Executive Assistant to the Superintendent 
Acting Pedagogical Employees (salary to be determined in accordance 
with City policy) 
Managerial Employees (salary to be determined in accordance with 
City policy) 
Civil Service Provisionals (salary to be determined in accordance 
with City policy), Exempt and Non-competitive, above Managerial 
Level I salary, in accordance with the Managerial Pay Plan 
;and be i t further .. 
RESOLVED, That the failure to undergo such investigation shall constitute grounds for 
denial of appointment, assignment or promotion to an affected position or termination 
of services, if employment in the position has already commenced; and be i t further 
RESOLVED, That the Chancellor and the Inspector General be authorized to develop the 
administrative procedures required to implement the intent of this resolution, 
E X P L A N A T I O N 
The Mayor has issued Executive Order .#72, dated April 23, 1984, amending Executive 
Order #16, issued July 26, 1978. While the Executive Order i s not binding on the 
Members of the Board of Education and staff included in the t i t l e s l i s ted above, the 
Board is voluntarily agreeing to require background investigations for certain t i t l e s 
consistent with the Mayor's Executive Order, such investigations to be conducted by 
the Department of Investigation. Elected officials are presently exempt from compli-
ance with this Executive Order. 
Due to the sensi t ivi ty, security and public safety aspects of certain positions and 
t i t l e s , the l i s t of t i t l e s for which employees must be investigated as a condition of 
employment by the Department of Investigation will include the l i s t of t i t l e s and 
levels as indicated above. 
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26. REGULATION TO REQUIRE FILING OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORMS 
The following resolutions are presented for adoption: 
WHEREAS, New York State Education Law §§2590-g subd. 14 and 2590-e'subd. 21 and the 
Bylaws of the Board of Education Article 6 require the Board of Education to prescribe 
a regulation requiring the members of the Board of Education, the Chancellor, the mem-
bers of Community School Boards and Community Superintendents to file with the Board 
of Education, or such office as may be designated, financial reports for themselves 
and their spouses, and authorizes the Board of Education for good cause shown, to 
require filing of such reports by other employees; now therefore be it 
RESOLVED, That all persons serving in the titles set forth below and in other posi-
tions for good cause shown, as determined by theJLoard of Education or the Chancellor, 
shall file annually with the Board of Education or such office as may be designated 
financial reports for themselves and their spouses: 
Member Board of Education - - . 
Member Community School Board 
Secretary, Board of Education 
Counsel to the Board of Education 
Inspector General 
Legislative Representative • ' 
Assistant Secretary, Board of Education .. 
Assistant to Board Member 
Chancellor •' ' " -
Deputy Chancellor 
Chief Executive 
Assistants to. the Chancellor 
Assistants to the Deputy Chancellor 
Assistants to the Chief Executives 
Executive Director 
Community Superintendent 
A Assistant Superintendent 
/ Deputy Executive Director 
Deputy Community Superintendent 
Deputy Assistant Superintendent 
Administrative Assistant Superintendent 
Director 
Deputy Director 
Executive Assistant/Secretary to Community School Board 
Executive Assistant to the Superintendent 
Acting Pedagogical Employees (salary to be determined in 
accordance with City policy) 
Managerial Employees (salary to be determined in 
accordance with City policy) 
Civil Service Provisionals (salary to be determined in 
accordance with City policy), Exempt and Non-competitive» 
above Managerial Level I salary, in accordance with the 
' Managerial Pay Plan 
;and be i t further 
RESOLVED, That the financial disclosure form to be filed shall require the reporting 
of the following: amount and source of all income of $1000.00 or more with a descrip-
tion of the service performed; amount and source of all gif ts , capital gains, reim-
bursement for expenditures and honoraria of $500.00 or more; investments in any secu-
r i t i e s and ownership of real property worth $5000.00 or more; any indebtedness to any 
creditor in an amount of $5000.00 or more for a period of at least 90 consecutive 
days, the name of the creditor to be provided; any beneficial interest in a t rus t or 
fiduciary,relationship valued at $2000.00 or more; and be i t further 
RESOLVED, Tnat all officers and employees required to f i le must do so not la ter than 
October 1, 1984 and not la te r than July 1 of each year thereafter; and be i t further 
RESOLVED, That the Chancellor and the Inspector General be authorized to. develop 
appropriate forms and administrative procedures required to implement the intent of 
th is resolution and that such reports be deemed confidential to the extent permitted 
by law. 
Bd. Ed. Mtg. 10/10/84 
Ca l . No. 38 
APPENDIX D 
October 4, 1984 
AKFHPKENT OF RESOLUTION REQUIRING FILING OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS 
The fo l lowing reso lu t i ons are presented f o r adopt ion: 
PESCLYEP, That the Resolut ion adopted by the Board of- Education on -Ju l y - -3 , 
1984, r e l a t i ng to the f i l i n g of f i nanc ia l d isc losure repor ts be amended by 
modifying the l i s t o f t i t l e s f o r which f i nanc i a l d isc losure i s requ i red , as 
fo l lows: 
O 
Delete: Act ing Pedagogical Employees (sa lary to be determined i n 
accordance w i t h Ci ty po l i cy ) * . 
Managerial Employees (salary to be determined i n 
accordance w i t h Ci ty po l i c y ) • • 
"CiArii"—S%rvfce~Prov^ 
w i t h C i t y p o l i c y ) , Exempt and Non-competi t ive above Managerial 
Level I s a l a r y , i n accordance wi th the Managerial Pay Plan 
Add: A l l Personnel who. are members of the Management Pay Plan 
•Appointed, Ac t ing and In ter im Act ing pedagogical enployees 
(sa lary t o be determined in accordance w i th Ci ty p o l i c y ) 
Peruarietit arid Prov is iona l C i v i l Service Employees (sa lary to be 
determined i n accordance w i th Ci ty p o l i c y ) ; • 
and be i t f u r t h e r . 
PESPLYEP, That a l l 
) unchanged. 
•ther provisions of the o r i g i n a l r eso lu t i on remain 
E X P L A N A T I O N 
These changes are necessary in. order t o conform the Board of Education's 
requirements f o r . f i n a n c i a l disclosure w i th those o f C i t y agencies. The 
cur rent C i ty p o l i c y requ i res a l l managerial personnel and other employees 
earning $42,000 or Mibre to . f i l e f i nanc ia l d isc losure repo r t s . 
Submitted.by 
. Regan 
n*dent of the Board of Education 
A frue copy of 
cshon
 ^ OCT 1 0 1984 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. 
Respondent, 
-and GASE-NQ^-U-834-7 
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
The charge herein was filed by Professor Thomas C. Barry. 
It complains about the agency shop fee rebate procedures 
utilized by United University Professions (UUP). On February 5. 
1986, Barry addressed a letter to this Board complaining about 
the manner in which this matter has been processed by 
Administrative Law Judge Toomey, to whom it was assigned for 
hearing, and by Administrative Law Judge Zahm. to whom it was 
assigned for pre-hearing conferencing.- The letter was 
referred to the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The Director responded to Barry on 
February 18. 1986. informing him that in his judgment there had 
been no error in the conduct of the matter by the staff of 
1/The letter complains that different Administrative Law 
Judges were assigned to the hearing and the pre-hearing 
conference, that Zahm erred in postponing a pre-hearing 
conference and that she further erred in dispensing with a 
face-to-face pre-hearing conference in favor of a telephonic 
conference. 
Board - U-8347 
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this agency. 
On February 21, 1986, Barry once again wrote to us. His 
letter expressed dissatisfaction with the Director's 
disposition of the matter and he requested that we consider 
2/ the merits of his complaints before any hearing is held.— 
We deny Barry's motion. Section 204.7(h) of our Rules 
of Procedure provides that this Board may authorize 
exceptions to interlocutory rulings and conduct in a 
proceeding. We read Barry's motion as requesting such 
3/ 
authorization.- The basis for granting such a motion is 
2/Barry had made an earlier motion requesting this 
Board to "take direct and immediate charge of this 
case...." That motion was denied on November 13, 1985 
(18 PERB 1P078). 
3/By its terms, 204.7(h) only refers to rulings made 
at hearings. We do not consider whether it is available to 
review pre-hearing rulings because counsel to UUP has 
expressly indicated that he does not object to the 
utilization of that procedural mechanism here. 
If, in the alternative, we were to read the motion as a 
request that we exercise administrative control over the 
conduct of the Director or the Administrative Law Judges, 
we would dismiss it on the ground that it is not directed 
to our jurisdiction. We are a quasi-judicial body which 
reviews legal rulings and determinations. 
The Chairman of this Board is also the administrative 
head of the agency. He has delegated supervision of the 
Administrative Law Judges unit to the Director. He does 
not normally evaluate the Director's exercise of that 
responsibility with respect to a specific case so long as 
that case may be brought before him, as a member of this 
Board, for quasi-judicial disposition. 
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that denial would result in harm to a party that could not be 
remedied by us in our review of a final decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge. There is no indication in the 
papers before us that such is the case here. 
Accordingly. WE ORDER that the motion herein be. and it 
hereby is. denied, 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
A/^CJ^t^^^^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
'
t
^~ * - <ci^<s^t-^\^^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN 
Respondent, 
— -and- GASE-NQ.-U-8-2-9-1 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN WHITE AND 
BLUE COLLAR UNITS. CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN. 
Employer. 
-and-
BROOKHAVEN TOWN ASSOCIATION OF 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. CASE NO. C-2951 
Petitioner. 
-and-
LOCAL 852. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor 
COOPER & SAPIR, P.C. (LEONARD COOPER. ESQ. and 
DAVID M. COHEN. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Town of 
Brookhaven 
ROGERS & CARTIER. P.C. (JAMES K. HOGAN. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Brookhaven Town Association of 
Municipal Employees 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (WILLIAM M. WALLENS. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for CSEA 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Board - U-8291 & C-2951 
-2 
For a period of years the employees of the Town of 
Brookhaven (Town) were represented by Local 852. Civil 
Service Employees Association (CSEA) in three separate units — 
one for blue-collar employees, one for white-collar employees 
and one for highway department employees. On May 29. 1985. 
the Brookhaven Town Association of Municipal Employees 
(BTAME) filed a timely petition to represent the highway 
department unit of the Town (Case C-2951). 
The time to file a representation petition expired the 
following day. Sometime thereafter, the Town opposed the 
petition on the ground that the highway department unit was 
inappropriate. It contended that such a unit should be 
I consolidated with the other two units of Town employees, or. 
in the alternative, with just the blue-collar unit. A 
hearing was held during which the parties submitted evidence 
on the merits of the unit issue. 
While the matter was pending before the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). 
CSEA demanded that the Town negotiate with respect to the 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the 
blue and white-collar units. The Town refused to do so and 
CSEA filed the charge herein (Case U-8291). On January 30. 
1986. we issued a decision in the improper practice case, 
finding the Town in violation of its duty to negotiate in 
good faith. The basis of our decision was our holding that 
I 
J 
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the petition did not raise an appropriate unit question and 
that the Town's response, which did raise such an issue, did 
not do so in a timely fashion. We said: 
A representation petition which merely raises 
a question of majority status within a unit 
does not place into question the 
appropriateness^)^OtairunrET Here, the"onry 
petition, which was filed by the independent 
employee organization, merely raised a 
question of majority status. It follows that 
a public employer may not diminish or delay 
its bargaining obligation on the ground that a 
unit is not appropriate unless either it makes 
a timely challenge to the appropriateness of 
the unit or that appropriateness has been 
placed in question by the timely petition of 
another party. Accordingly, there is no 
pending question concerning the representation 
rights of CSEA in the blue-collar and 
white-collar units, (footnote omitted) 
Four days later the Director issued his decision in the 
representation case. Based upon our holding in the improper 
practice case that the appropriate unit issue had not been 
raised by a timely petition, he declined to consider that 
issue. Finding that the petition therefore merely raised the 
question of the majority status of CSEA in the highway unit, 
he ordered an election in that unit. 
On the same day as the Director issued his decision, the 
Town moved this Board to reconsider our decision in the 
J- *ll£-r J. \ S £f V* J. £*J.A\«*W>.l-Vrf-\~- \— O. tJ \— » i , l t W J , \ « U J L U > C i - ( J . W J. J . i . C U C i V V / W ^ V J . V 1 J . D *-• W 
the decision of the Director in the representation case. 
Inasmuch as the Director's decision was a necessary 
consequence of our decision in the improper practice case, we 
10203 
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consolidate these two matters for decision. 
The grounds for a court or administrative agency 
reconsidering its decision is that it has overlooked or 
misapprehended relevant facts or that it has misapplied a 
controlling principle of law.— 
Having reviewed the papers which the Town has submitted 
to us and the record in both the representation and improper 
practice cases, we conclude that there are no facts which we 
overlooked or misapprehended in issuing our prior decision. 
As to the proposition that our decision misapplied a 
controlling principle of law. the Town argues that the 
decision is inconsistent with Town of Putnam Valley. 
17 PERB 1[3041 (1984). In that case, we remanded a 
representation case to the Director to determine whether a 
union's petition was timely or whether it was barred by an 
existing agreement between the employer and the intervenor. 
In doing so we did not consider whether the Town made a 
timely objection to the petition on the ground that the 
existing negotiating unit was inappropriate. We distinguish 
that decision because the issue which is before us in the 
instant case was not before us in that case. We further note 
that in any event we are free to overrule a prior decision 
when new insights persuade us that doing so would be more 
JL/West Realty Co. v. City of New York. 99 A.D.2d 708 
(1st Dep't 1984). 
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consistent with the language of the Taylor Law and its 
2/ 
underlying public policy.— To the extent that the 
procedure countenanced in Town of Putnam Valley may be 
inconsistent with our decisions here, it is rejected. 
Accordingly, we deny the Town's motion in U-8291. 
The Director's decision in C-2951 is the only one that 
he could have reached in that case consistent with our 
decision in U-8291. Accordingly, we affirm that decision. 
NOW THEREFORE. WE ORDER 
1. that the motion in U-8291 be. and it hereby is, 
denied, and 
2. that an election by secret ballot shall be held 
under the supervision of the Director among the 
employees in the petitioned-for unit who were 
employed by the Town on the payroll date 
immediately preceding the date of this decision, 
and 
3. that the Town shall submit to the Director, as 
well as to BTAME and CSEA. within 15 working days 
from the date of receipt of this decision, an 
alphabetized list of all employees in the unit 
with their corresponding job titles, who were 
-''county of Orange. 14 PERB 1f3060 (1981). 
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DATED: 
employed by it on the payroll date immediately 
preceding the date of this decision. 
March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
<^u2^j^/C.A^yKJ^^^^ 
l a r o l d R. Newman. Chai rman 
M^_ X 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
i 
In the Matter of 
COMMACK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
and- CASE NO.-U—7-774 
JOSEPH B. MARGOLIN. 
Charging Party. 
DOLORES SCHIRMER. for Respondent 
JULIUS BLAUSHIELD. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Joseph 
Margolin to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing his charge against the Commack Teachers Association 
(Association). The charge alleges that the Association 
violated its duty of fair representation in that it refused to 
process Margolin's grievance complaining about an out-of-title 
assignment by the Commack Union Free School District 
(District) and that it did not keep him adequately informed 
about its handling of the grievance. 
FACTS 
Margolin, a social studies teacher, was assigned a 
"writing and reading" class which meets one period each day. 
10207 
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He perceived this assignment to violate Article XVIII. 
§18.01(K) of the Association-District collective bargaining 
agreement, and complained to the Association. The relevant 
contract provision provides: 
All other factors being equal, seniority 
sharr~£rr~eva~iI~wirth reirpelftr~ito~~cla^ s ~-
assignments and duties, class loads and use 
of portable classrooms. Such seniority 
rights shall be accorded to tenured teachers 
only and shall be based only on the total 
number of years teaching in the District. 
Attempting to deal with Margolin's dissatisfaction 
informally, the Association brought it to the attention of 
Margolin's department chairman. The department chairman 
stood by the assignment and declined to give any explanation 
for it. The Association informed Margolin of this meeting 
and then brought the matter to the attention of the building 
principal. The building principal supported the department 
chairman: the record does not indicate whether she gave any 
explanation for this position. 
At this point, the Association building committee met 
and decided not to file a grievance on behalf of Margolin. 
It based its decision on its own investigation of the 
circumstances of the assignment. Its reasons were that the 
school was facing an emergency situation because of the 
resignation of a teacher just prior to the opening of 
school, and that most of the teachers in the department had 
had recent out-of-title assignments. 
10208 
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Margolin then pursued his grievance on his own. 
Thinking that the Association's meeting with the department 
chairman had satisfied step 1 of the grievance procedure, he 
proceeded to step 2, a meeting with the principal. He was 
informed that the Association's meeting with the department 
chairman had been informal and that he was therefore 
required to begin at step 1. At Margolin's request, an 
Association representative appeared with him at step 1 and 
step 2, but the Association took no position on the merits. 
The grievance was denied at step 1 and step 2. It was not 
taken to step 3, which is arbitration, because only the 
Association can take a grievance to step 3. 
At this point Margolin filed the charge herein against 
the Association. He also filed a complaint against the 
District with the Education Commissioner. 
The Education Commissioner found for Margolin against 
the District. In doing so, the Commissioner concluded that 
the District's interpretation of the contract was not 
rational.- He indicated that the factors considered 
I/The Commissioner's decision states: 
The standard of review on appeals to the 
Commissioner of Education involving the 
interpretation of a collective bargaining 
agreement is whether the interpretation by the 
board of education is unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious . . . . 
10209 
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by the District in making the assignment were its 
"belief that the petitioner's teaching 
strengths, particularly the high 
degree of organization and structure 
he provides within his lessons, were 
very well suited to the curriculum of 
trhe^ wr_it_iTi^ Fnc"eading course"T~ancT, thatT 
other factors considered were teacher 
certification, class load, relative 
strengths and weaknesses of various 
teachers within subject areas and the 
number of consecutive teaching periods. 
The Education Commissioner determined that these factors 
were not sufficient to overcome the seniority language in 
the collective bargaining agreement because: 
[n]o specifics whatever were offered 
concerning those factors enumerated by 
the assistant superintendent, and there 
is no indication that any of those 
factors, particularly certification 
status, are different with respect to 
the other teachers concerned. 
In dismissing the charge against the Association, the 
ALJ found that the Association's conduct was not improperly 
motivated. Over the objections of the Association, she 
admitted some documentary evidence designed to show improper 
motivation, but she found that the evidence did not justify 
10210 
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2/ 
such a conclusion.- The ALJ also rejected other 
documents which Margolin sought to introduce to establish 
improper motivation on the ground that they were not 
relevant. These documents relate to a dispute that Margolin 
had with leaders of the Association regarding a matter that 
3/ 
arose after the charge herein was filed.-
Margolin's exceptions argue that the ALJ erred in not 
finding improper motivation. He also argues that the ALJ 
erred in rejecting the documents. 
The ALJ found that the Association's conduct was not 
grossly negligent. Margolin argues that the Association's 
refusal to take the grievance was grossly negligent in that 
its interpretation of the relevant contract clause was not 
rational. In part, he relies upon the decision of the 
Education Commissioner for this conclusion. His exceptions 
2/The evidence shows that in 1984. Margolin had 
refused to contribute to an Association sponsored "VOTE 
COPE" drive because of some dissatisfaction with a local 
unit of the Association. An Association building 
representative had criticized Margolin's position as 
constituting an imputation of guilt by association and had 
told him that this was inconsistent with Margolin's 
religious sensibilities. Margolin was offended by the 
criticism. 
3/it had to do with a vote on proposed amendments to 
the Association's constitution scheduled for February 27, 
1985. 
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argue that the ALJ erred in not receiving the Education 
Commissioner's decision in evidence. 
Margolin further argues that the Association was 
grossly negligent in not taking his grievance because two 
fellow employees with lower seniority had been passed over 
in the assignment of out-of-title work. The Association's 
investigation showed that this was true. However, it also 
showed that one had been assigned a reduced teaching 
schedule to accommodate his duties as dean of discipline. 
It showed that the second was the only qualified social 
studies teacher available to teach psychology, and she was 
given a last minute assignment to teach psychology when the 
other qualified psychology teacher was given an emergency 
assignment to teach computer science. 
Finally, the ALJ found no violation by reason of the 
Association having misled Margolin into believing that a 
grievance had been filed and carried through step 1. 
Finding that there was a misunderstanding between the 
Association Representative and Margolin as to what Margolin 
was told about the Association meeting with the department 
chairman, she did not reach any conclusion as to which of 
the two was responsible for the misunderstanding. Her 
reason for not resolving this issue was that it is 
irrelevant in that the misunderstanding, even if 
attributable to the Association, could not rise to the level 
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of gross negligence. She further noted that Margolin was 
not prejudiced by the misunderstanding. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the ALJ. She did not err in 
excluding the proffered documents which Margolin contends 
would have established that the Association was improperly 
motivated when it refused to take the grievance. As stated 
by the ALJ, "[t]hey related to an entirely different 
situation which occurred well after the filing of the 
instant charge . . . " and, therefore, could not establish 
animus as of the time of the events which precipitated the 
charge. We also confirm the conclusion of the ALJ that the 
record evidence which shows some prior differences between 
Margolin and the Association does not establish improper 
motivation. 
The question whether the Association was grossly 
negligent in interpreting its collective bargaining 
agreement as not compelling the assignment of the "writing 
and reading" class to a fellow employee junior to Margolin 
turns on the contract language: "All other factors being 
equal, seniority shall prevail . . . ." It does not appear 
that the District provided the Association with any-
reasonable explanation for its action. However, the 
Association's own investigation satisfied it that all 
factors were not equal. Its investigation revealed an 
emergency situation brought about by the resignation of a 
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teacher just prior to the opening of school which had 
necessitated various teacher reassignments. Those teachers 
junior to Margolin who were passed over for the out-of-title 
assignment had been given other special assignments which 
the Association could reasonably conclude made other factors 
unequal. 
An unusual circumstance in this case is that the 
Education Commissioner found that the District acted 
arbitrarily in assigning the out-of-title work to 
4/ 
Margolin.- We note, however, that the Association was 
not a party to the proceeding before the Commissioner and 
that the District offered no specifics to the Commissioner 
to justify its action. As the cases involve different 
parties and a different record, we have no compunction about 
finding that the Association was not arbitrary in refusing 
to grieve the District's action. 
Finally, we affirm the ALJ's determination that the 
misunderstanding between Margolin and the Association 
representative -- as to whether its meeting with the 
department chairman was an informal one or the first step of 
the grievance procedure — could not constitute a violation 
of the Association's duty of fair representation even if the 
4/The ALJ did not err in excluding the decision as 
evidence. As a quasi-judicial determination in the public 
domain, it is properly before us even without being 
admitted. 
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misunderstanding is attributable to the Association. The 
fact that Margolin was not prejudiced by it is sufficient to 
establish that it could not constitute gross negligence. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 4. 1986, 
Albany. New York 
C0Ld^~7t^j&^t~,* 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
l/U^MZ~£„ 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
— and- CASE-NO.—U—78-3 9 
WAPPINGERS FEDERATION OF TRANSIT. 
CUSTODIAL AND MAINTENANCE WORKERS, 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS. 
Charging Party. 
RAYMOND G. KRUSE, P.C. (MAUREEN McNAMARA. Esq.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS by HARRY W. FAIRBANK. 
for Charging Party 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION 
On December 6. 1985. an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
issued a decision holding that the Wappingers Central School 
District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. 
Later that day the decision was sent to the parties by-
certified mail, return receipt requested. The copy sent to 
the District's superintendent was received on December 9. 
1985, but there is a question as to when it was received by 
the District's lawyer. This Board has a receipt dated 
December 9, 1985. which appears to bear the signature "B. 
10216 
Board - U-7839 
-2 
Sutter". On January 6, 1986, the District's lawyer filed 
exceptions to the decision of the ALJ. That filing would not 
be timely if the District is charged with receipt of the 
decision on December 9, 1985. If, however, it is not charged 
with the receipt of the decision before December 12, 1985, 
the filing is timely.-
The Wappingers Federation of Transit, Custodial and 
Maintenance Workers, New York State United Teachers 
(Federation), the charging party herein, filed a response to 
the exceptions which did not address their merits but merely 
argued that they were not timely. The basis of this argument 
is that both the District's superintendent and lawyer had 
been served before December 12, 1985. This response raises 
two questions: 
1. Was the copy of the decision sent to the District's 
lawyer received by him or his agent prior to December 
12. 1985? 
2. Was the receipt of the decision by the District's 
superintendent on December 9. 1985 sufficient to 
commence the 15-day period of limitations for the filing 
of exceptions? 
The parties were invited to submit memoranda addressing these 
questions. 
i/Section 204.10 of our Rules of Procedure provides 
that exceptions may be filed "[w]ithin 15 working days 
after receipt of the decision and recommended order...." 
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The District's lawyer submitted an affirmation in 
which he stated that he never employed anyone named B. 
Sutter or bearing a similar name. Furthermore, he stated 
that he does not know anyone who has that name or any 
similar name. He listed the attorneys and clerical 
employees associated with his office, the names of none of 
whom could be mistaken for B. Sutter. Finally, he stated 
that his office received the decision for the first time on 
December 12. 1985. 
On the basis of this affirmation we conclude that 
neither he nor any agent of his received the decision 
before December 12. 1985. As our rules expressly provide 
that the 15-day period during which exceptions may be filed 
runs from the date of "receipt" of an ALJ decision, insofar 
as service upon the District's lawyer is concerned, the 
exceptions are timely. 
This focuses our attention on the second question. Did 
receipt of the decision by the District's superintendent 
commence the time period? We answer this question in the 
negative. Section 168 of the Executive law provides that 
any state agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, and 
this Board is such an agency, is required to serve all 
notices, other than subpoenas, upon lawyers who appear 
before it on behalf of parties. 
Citing this statute, the Court of Appeals has said: 
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Board - U-7839 -4 
[0]nce counsel has appeared in a matter a 
Statute of Limitations or time requirement 
cannot begin to run unless that counsel is 
served with the determination or the order or 
judgment sought to be reviewed [citation 
omitted].2/ 
Aeeor-ding-1-y-r^ we h o - l d — t ^ — 
the District's superintendent did not commence the running of 
the limitations period for the filing of the exceptions 
herein and that the exceptions were timely filed. We give 
the Federation seven working days from receipt of this 
decision to file a response to the exceptions on the merits. 
DATED: March 4. 198 6 
Albany, New York 
^Bianca v. Frank. 43 N.Y.2d 168. 173 (1977). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
GLEN COVE. 
Employer. CASE NO. C-2957 
-and-
LOGAL 810. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD BOARD DECISION 
OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMEN ON MOTION 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner. 
The City School District of the City of Glen Cove 
(District) has filed exceptions to a decision of the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
ordering an election in a negotiating unit of clerical 
employees of the District. It contends that the negotiating 
unit in which the election is to be held is not appropriate. 
On February 12. 1986. the attorney for Local 810. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs. 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (petitioner) sent us a 
letter transmitting a written statement issued by the 
District after the close of the record, and urging us to 
consider that statement. According to the petitioner, the 
statement indicates that the District was improperly 
motivated in challenging the appropriateness of the 
negotiating unit which petitioner seeks to represent. Two 
days later, the attorney for the District wrote to us 
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objecting to any consideration of this material. 
We treat the petitioner's letter of February 12, 1986 as 
a motion to reopen the record to receive new evidence. One 
of the bases for granting such a motion is that if the 
evidence were introduced at the original hearing it would 
probably have affected the decision.— Applying that test 
here we decline to consider the new material submitted by the 
2/ petitioner. — That material is not relevant to the 
representation issue before us. Improper motivation may be 
an element of some improper practices but it is not a factor 
in deciding whether a unit sought is an appropriate one under 
§207 of the Taylor law. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the motion be. and it 
hereby is. denied. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Memh/er 
1/compare Adjunct Faculty Association. 18 PERB 1[3076 
(1985) . 
2/For this limited purpose, we assume, without 
actually reaching the merits of the matter, that the 
decision on appeal will be against the petitioner. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF JOHNSBURG, 
Employer, 
— -and- — — •— — - — CASE-NO—0^3004 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 13. 1985. the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc., Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO (petitioner) 
filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the 
Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition for 
certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of 
certain employees employed by the Town of Johnsburg 
(employer). 
Thereafter, the parties stipulated that the bargaining 
unit would be as follows: 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time 
laborers and mechanical equipment 
operators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to the stipulation, and in order for the 
petitioner to demonstrate its majority status, a secret 
ballot election was held on January 23. 1986. The results 
of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
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voters in the stipulated unit do not desire to be 
represented by the petitioner.-
THEREFORE. IT IS ORDERED that the petition be. and it 
hereby is. dismissed. . 
DATED: March 4. 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
y 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
1/ Of the 12 ballots cast, none was challenged, 9 were 
against and 3 were for representation by the petitioner 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MT. PLEASANT-BLYTHEDALE UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-29^6 
BLYTHEDALE TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
BLYTHEDALE TEACHERS GROUP. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Blythedale Teachers Group 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
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representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees employed in the titles of 
regular teacher and teacher-intern. 
"Exc 1;u:de~d~: ATT~orthrer erap 1oye e s 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Blythedale Teachers Group 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of. and 
administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany, New York 
.^P A d Q^S( J—71A^t*~, 
^ Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
#3B-3/V86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WEBB UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-3016 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
TOWN OF WEBB SCHOOLS CIVIL SERVICE 
PERSONNEL. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board. and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Local 1000. AFSCME. has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named' public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time custodial. 
cafeteria, clerical and transportation 
employees, in addition to School 
Nurse/Attendance and School Bus Drivers. 
——- ExciudeiT i£e~aTl~CTrs^07lliaTi7^ 
portation Manager, District Clerk, 
District Treasurer, Tax Collector, 
and all other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000. AFSCME and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, 
and shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization 
in the determination of, and administration of, grievances of 
such employees. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
L-^L&^CcZ.. <- ^i^^^^<^ 
Walter L. E i s e n b e r g . Member ibfcr 
#3C-3A/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBION CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
--^ahd=-— — — — — - CASE^NO^-C-361:y 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC.. 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME, AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
ALBION CENTRAL SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS' 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc., Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
10228 
Certification - C-3019 page 2 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Bus drivers, auto mechanics and 
— ; —^^mechanrc^he-Ipers . — ~ — ~ ~~ ~ 
Excluded: All other and management/confidential 
employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of. 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: March 4. 19 8 6 
Albany. New York 
jfctr* 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
x 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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#3D-3A/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BAYPORT-BLUE POINT UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-anti- CASE NO. C-3014 
BAYPORT-BLUE POINT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Bayport-Blue Point Teachers 
Association. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time, licensed registered 
professional nurses. 
Excluded :^ 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Bayport-Blue Point Teachers 
Association. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, 
and shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization 
in the determination of. and administration of. grievances of 
such employees. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
AfJ? I? '?-\f.KjZs\^__ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Membek 
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#3E-3/V86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PANAMA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
-ancb- —- -- —^ - - —CASE^NO ^-C-3 008 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. AFSCME. LOCAL 1000. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
PANAMA CENTRAL SCHOOLS NON-TEACHING 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. AFSCME. Local 1000. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
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for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Monitors, Custodians. Cleaners. 
Secretary. Teacher Aide. Teaching 
Assistants. Bus Driver and Bus Mechanic. 
Excluded: Head Custodian. Head Bus Driver. 
Cafeteria Manager, Secretary to 
Superintendent, Business Manager and 
Account Clerk. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of. and administration of. 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Me-mber 
£33 
#3F-3A/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANGELICA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
— — —and—— - - - ••-•-- __— —CASE~NQ-—G-3QQ3 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. AFSCME. LOCAL 1000. AFL-CIO. . 
Petitioner. 
-and-
ANGELICA NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL 
ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. AFSCME. Local 1000. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full:- and part-time custodian/ 
bus drivers, senior custodian, 
head custodian, cook, cook 
manager, food service helper, 
cashier, teacher aide, cafeteria 
monitor, bus driver, school nurse, 
mechanic/bus driver, study hall 
monitor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. AFSCME. Local 1000. AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of. 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: March 4. 198 6 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
21 •£&*— 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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#3G-3A/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NISKAYUNA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer, 
-
1
—aiia- " -1 — ^ — — — -^CASE^Q—C^OTrCr 
NISKAYUNA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. NEA/NEW YORK. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
NISKAYUNA SCHOOL DISTRICT OPERATIONAL 
UNIT. CSEA. INC.. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Niskayuna Central School 
District Employees Association. NEA/New York has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
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described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included:Senior Bus Mechanic, Senior Maintenance 
Mechanic, Bus Mechanic^ BlTiTdTng 
Mechanic. Maintenance. Groundsmen. 
Mechanic Helper. Custodian. 
Custodian/Bus Driver, Light Equipment 
Operator. Utility Man. Cleaner, 
full-time and part-time Bus Drivers, 
Dispatchers. Head Custodian. Senior 
Custodian, Night Head Custodian. Food 
Service Helpers. Cook Manager. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Niskayuna Central School 
District Employees Association. NEA/New York and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the above 
unit, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
DATED: March 4. 19 8 6 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3H-3A/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
a^nd^ - -— CASE^JSia—JEU^23S3^ 
UNITED SUPPORT ALLIANCE OF EDUCATION 
SUPPORT PERSONNEL. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
NASSAU EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 865. CSEA. 
AFSCME. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Support Alliance of 
Education Support Personnel has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All buildings and grounds classified 
personnel. 
Excluded: Temporary and substitute personnel. 
Head Custodian I. Head Custodian II, 
Head Custodian III. Maintenance 
Supervisor I. Supervisor of Operations 
and—alHF-ot'hei:—employees". 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Support Alliance of 
Education Support Personnel and enter into a written agreement 
with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
O^frtfc. Z\-
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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#311-3/4/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF MOUNT MORRIS. 
Employer. 
-H&n&-^ - - - - , - _ ^ ^ i z ^ ^ ^ B E ^ Q ^ e ^ 9 ^ z ^ ^ i 
LOCAL 200. SERVICE EMPLOYEES' 
INTERNATIONAL UNION. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 200. Service Employees' 
International Union. AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full and regular part-time 
employees in the following titles: 
Sewer and Water Operators and Highway 
Laborers. 
^Excluded: ATI other employees 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 200. Service Employees' 
International Union. AFL-CIO and enter into a written agreement 
with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: March 4. 1986 
Albany. New York 
'^n-t>^f-eJ?R, k)<zjurr* -m^t^j 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
LAA-JUAZ^ &~ £d^L* 
Walter L. E i s e n b e r g . Men(ber 
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#3J-3A/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VESTAL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
^^—^——and-^-^^ ^  ^^__._ ^ ^ _ ,^_^_^eASE^NOv^e^g^^e^ 
VESTAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION/NEA. 
NEA/NEW YORK. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
VESTAL CENTRAL SCHOOL UNIT. BROOME 
EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 866. CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC.. LOCAL 
1000. AFSCME. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees! Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Vestal Employees 
Association/NEA. NEA/New York has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
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their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Employees employed on a full-time or part-
time basis in the following titles: Senior 
Typist; Typist; Clerk Typist; Senior 
Account Clerk; Account Clerk; Building 
~ MaTnireTX^ 
Operator; Duplicating Machine Operator; 
Payroll Clerk; Senior Stores Clerk; Stores 
Clerk; Stenographer; Head Bus Driver; 
Automotive Mechanic; Head Automotive 
Mechanic; Automotive Servceman; Bus 
Driver; Bus Monitor; Cook Manager; Cook; 
Food Service Helper; Building Maintenance 
Supervisor; Building Maintenance Worker; 
Groundskeeper; Custodian; Head Custodian; 
Matron; Senior Clerk. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Vestal Employees 
Association/NEA. NEA/New York and enter into a written agreement 
with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: March 4. 198 6 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
/C ~ C&O-
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g . Me-mber 
Q) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
5 0 W O L F ROAD 
ALBANY. NEW YORK 1 2 2 0 5 
MINUTES OF THE BOARD MEETING 
March 19, 1986 
AlbanyvrNew^York 
PRESENT: HAROLD R. NEWMAN, Chairman 
WALTER L. EISENBERG, Member 
Staff: Jerome Lefkowitz, Deputy Chairman 
Mary Messina, Secretary to the Board 
1. Minutes of. the Board Meeting of March 3-4, 1986 approved. 
2. Board Decisions and Orders 
) A. U-8546 - In the Matter of Brunswick Central School District, 
Respondent and Patricia Jackson, Charging Party. (#2A-3/19/86). 
B. C-2957 - In the Matter of City School District of the City of Glen 
Cove, Employer and Local 810, IBT, Petitioner. (#2B-3/19/86). 
C. C-2955 - In the Matter of Northport-East Northport UFSD, Employer 
and United Teachers of Northport. NYSUT. Petitioner. (#2C-3/19/86). 
3. Board Certifications 
A. C-2970 - In the Matter of Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of Buffalo, Employer and AFSCME, Council 35, 
Petitioner. (#3A-3/19/86). 
4. Oral Argument 
A. U-8017 - City of Buffalo and AFSCME, Local 650 - The Board 
granted the request of the respondent for an opportunity to present oral 
argument. The argument will be held on Tuesday, April 1, 1986 at 10:30 
a.m. at the Board's Albany office. The parties will be so notified. 
> 
MINUTES OF THE BOARD 
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B. C-2944 - City of Schenectady and Schenectady PBA - The Board 
granted the request of the employer for an opportunity to present oral 
argument. The argument will be held on Tuesday, April 15, 1986 at 10:00 
a.m. at the Board's Albany office. The parties will be so notified. 
5. Board Case Discussion 
A. E-1056 - City of Jamestown - The Board discussed the matters 
involved-in—this~prx>ceeding^and~re^ 
prepared for the next meeting of the Board. 
B. U-7979 - Request of PBA of Newburgh for Reconsideration of decision 
of September 10, 1985 - After consideration of the request of PBA of 
Newburgh contained in a letter of February 24, 1986 and the response of 
the City of Newburgh dated March 3, 1986, the Board instructed Counsel to 
advise the PBA that it could not entertain the request in light of the 
pending Article 78 proceeding in Court. The Board also authorized 
Counsel to advise that, in any event, there was no proper basis for 
reconsideration of the Board's decision. 
C. Request for Reconsideration of Panel Applicant Standards - Upon 
receipt of a letter from a Professor at the University of Buffalo, dated 
March 12, 1986, the Board instructed the Director of Conciliation to 
( survey other agencies which administer panels of arbitration to ascertain 
how they treat panel applicants who are members of unions. 
The next meeting of the Board will be held on March 31-April 1, 1986 at its 
Albany office. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Mary Messina 
Secretary to the Board 
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#2A- 3/19/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRUNSWICK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
=a&8= —- GASE^NO^-U-85^6^^ 
PATRICIA A. JACKSON. 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
On January 27, 1986. Patricia A. Jackson filed a charge 
in which she alleged that the Brunswick Central School 
District (District) violated paragraphs (a) and (d) of 
§209-a.l of the Taylor Law. The basis of her charge is that 
the District, acting through its superintendent, 
"unreasonably denied the Charging Party an opportunity to 
obtain effective representation and willfully misused the 
grievance procedure to obtain information and prejudicial 
statements from the Charging Party in support of disciplinary 
charges then contemplated." Jackson's charge contains 
allegations of fact in support of this proposition. 
On January 31, 1986, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
assigned to the case informed Jackson that her charge would 
be processed only insofar as it alleges a violation of 
§209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. Jackson understood this 
letter to constitute a final decision dismissing her 
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allegation that the District's conduct violated 
§209-a.l(d)— and filed exceptions to that dismissal. 
The District has responded to those exceptions arguing 
that they are premature because the charge as a whole was not 
d l smis sed[_._ 
Section 204.7(h) of our Rules of Procedure provides: 
All motions and rulings made at the hearing 
shall be part of the record of the 
proceeding and, unless expressly authorized 
by the Board, shall not be appealed directly 
to the Board but shall be considered by the 
Board whenever the case is submitted to it 
for decision. 
Although by its terms this Rule applies only to rulings made 
at a hearing, the policy underlying it applies, a fortiari, 
to pre-hearing rulings. Accordingly, we determine that 
Jackson may not appeal the ruling of the ALJ as a matter of 
3/ 
right.- In doing so, we note that the alleged violations 
1/Section 209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law deals with the 
duty of public employers to negotiate in good faith with 
employee organizations. 
£/The District also responded on the merits, but we 
need not reach this question. 
3/Rule 204.2, which provides for initial processing 
of a charge by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director), authorizes the Director to 
dismiss a charge for failure to allege facts that 
constitute a violation of law. Such a dismissal is subject 
to exceptions under Rule 204.10(c). The ALJ's letter of 
January 31, 1986 does not indicate that it was sent at the 
initiative of the Director. In any event, however, the 
result would be the same because the charge was not 
dismissed in its entirety. 
10247 
Board - U-8546 
-3 
of both paragraphs (a) and (d) of §209-a.l of the Taylor Law 
arise out of a single alleged series of wrongs. 
Jackson asserts that she could have filed separate 
charges, one complaining of the violation of §209-a.l(a) and 
the other complaining of the violation of §209-a.l(d). She 
argues that the dismissal of the (d) allegation would 
therefore be a final order, and to treat them as integrated 
constitutes a raising of form over substance. 
We are not persuaded by this argument. The (a) and (d) 
specifications of the charge constitute a single cause of 
action and they would constitute a single cause of action 
even if they had been specified in separate charges. 
This is the clear implication of CPLR R. 3211 which 
provides that a cause of action may be dismissed if "there is 
another action pending between the same parties for the same 
cause of action . . . ." Discussing this issue. Practice 
Commentary C. 3211:15 states: 
(1) Do both suits arise out of the same 
actionable wrong or series of wrongs? and 
(2) As a practical matter is there any good 
reason for two actions rather than one being 
brought in seeking the remedy? If the first 
question is answered Yes and the second one 
No, the court should . . . dismiss the action. 
Having determined that exceptions may not be filed as a 
matter of right, we treat the exceptions as a motion for 
authorization to appeal an interlocutory ruling under Rule 
204.7(h). Having done so, we deny the motion. There is no 
showing that Jackson will be prejudiced by the ruling of the 
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ALJ. It can be reviewed after a final decision is issued 
without irreparable harm having been done to her. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the motion herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 19, 1986 
Albany, New York 
•£/****£ &AL 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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#2B-3/19/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
in the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
GLEN COVE, 
Employer, 
~STl&- GASE^NO^=C-29 57 — 
LOCAL 810, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner. 
COOPER & SAPIR, P.C. (ROBERT E. SAPIR. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Employer 
SIDNEY L. MEYER. ESQ., for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
School District of the City of Glen Cove (District) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) ordering an election in a unit of 
full-time and part-time secretarial, clerical and school 
aides personnel. The District argues that the Director erred 
in ordering an election in that unit because the aides should 
not be placed in the same negotiating unit as the secretarial 
and clerical employees. It also argues that the Director 
erred in including Anastasia Basdavanos in the negotiating 
unit. Basdavanos holds the position of account clerk/payroll 
supervisor, a position which the District asserts is 
confidential. 
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A petition to represent the employees in the negotiating 
unit was filed by Local 810, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America 
(Local 810) on June 12. 1985. The unit consists of 
approximately 40 secretarial and clerical employees and 60 
aides. They have been in a single negotiating unit since 
1972. That unit came to be represented by the Glen Cove 
Educational Secretaries' Association (ESA) in 1972. It 
represented the unit in the negotiation of two contracts, the 
last of which expired on June 30, 1983. There were no 
negotiations between ESA and the District after that date, 
and, at some subsequent time, ESA was absorbed by Local 810. 
Local 810 then sought recognition as the representative of the 
existing negotiating unit. When the District denied its 
request for recognition, it filed the petition herein. 
The first question presented by the exceptions is whether 
the unit issue is properly before us. After the Director 
wrote his decision herein, we issued a decision in Town of 
Brookhaven,~ which holds that a petition raising a question 
2/ 
of majority status that is filed during a window period 
does not permit another party to raise a question of 
1/19 PERB ir3004 (1986), motion to reconsider denied, 19 
PERB 1P010 (1986) 
^/Section 201.3 (d) of our Rules of Procedure permits 
the filing of a petition for certification or decertification 
during a 30-day window period before the expiration of the 
period of unchallenged representation accorded recognized or 
certified employee organizations by §208.2 of the Taylor. Law. 
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appropriateness of the unit unless it raises that issue during 
that window period. The public policy underlying this 
position is that a public employer should not be permitted to 
bring representation issues before this Board at a time when 
the litigation of such issji^ _s__jwouj^ d__ijn,te^ fere_.j>rith its 
3/ bargaining obligation.- This policy does not apply in the 
instant situation because ESA is no longer seeking to 
negotiate on behalf of unit employees and the District is 
under no obligation to negotiate with Local 810. We therefore 
consider the merits of the issue of the appropriate unit. 
The first issue is whether the aides should be placed in 
a negotiating unit apart from the secretarial and clerical 
employees. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the decision 
of the Director that they should not be split. There is a 
history of joint negotiations and no significant evidence of 
4/ 
any conflict of interest between the two groups.- On the 
contrary, the record shows a close community of interest in 
that some aides and clerical employees perform functions which 
are almost identical and that many clerical employees were 
formerly aides. 
1/Compare Greece CSD. 18 PERB ir3033 (1985). 
4/The record affords no basis for concluding that the 
absence of negotiations between ESA and the District after 
June 30, 1983 is related to such a conflict of interest. 
5/The District cites Baldwinsville CSD, 12 PERB 1f3096 
(1979). and Great Neck UFSD, 5 PERB tf4028 (1971). in support 
of its position. Neither deals with facts similar to those 
in the record before us. 
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The second issue is whether Basdavanos should be removed 
from the unit on the ground that she is a confidential 
employee. The District argues that, like Weinheim in 
Washinqtonville CSD. 16 PERB 1P017 (1983), she prepares cost 
analyses of negotiation proposals which the District is 
considering and. as such, is privy to information to which the 
employee organization has no right. The record does not 
support this proposition. Using data that is not 
confidential, Basdavanos merely ascertains the cost of a 1% 
increase. The District, without Basdavanos1 participation, 
then ascertains the cost of contemplated increases by 
multiplying the 1% figure by other numbers. We affirm the 
decision of the Director that the work performed by Basdavanos 
is not confidential. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that an election by secret 
ballot be held under the supervision of 
the Director among the employees in the 
following unit: 
Included: All full-time and part-time 
secretarial, clerical and school 
aides personnel. 
Excluded: Secretary to the superintendent 
of schools, secretary to the 
assistant superintendent for 
business and secretary to the 
assistant superintendent for 
personnel. 
who were employed on the payroll date 
immediately preceding the date of this 
decision, unless Local 810 submits to 
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the Director within 15 days from the date 
of receipt of this decision evidence to 
satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) 
of the Rules of Procedure for 
certification without an election. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that the District submit to the Director. 
as well as to Local 810. within 15 days 
from the date of receipt of this decision, 
an alphabetized list of the employees in 
the above unit who were employed on the 
payroll date immediately preceding the 
date of this decision. 
DATED: March 19. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTHPORT-EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-^an^ -— .,--- CASE^NO^G-^955 
UNITED TEACHERS OF NORTHPORT, 
NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG & GROSS. ESQS. (PAUL L. 
DASHEFSKY. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Employer 
EUGENE M. KAUFMAN. ESQ.. for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On June 6, 1985, the United Teachers of Northport. NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO (UTN) filed a petition to represent a unit of per 
diem substitute teachers employed by the Northport-East 
Northport Union Free School District (District). The Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
issued a decision on January 17, 1986 ordering an election in 
such a unit to ascertain whether the employees in that unit 
wish to be represented by UTN. The matter comes to us on the 
exceptions of the District. 
It argues that the Director erred in finding that UTN 
submitted a sufficient showing of interest in support of its 
petition. It also argues that the Director erred in not 
disqualifying UTN from representing the per diem substitute 
teachers on the ground that such representation would conflict 
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with its status as representative of the regular teachers of 
the District. 
UTN is the representative of the regular teachers of the 
District. On April 4, 1985, it filed a petition to represent 
the District's per diem substitute teachers. The showing of 
interest in support of that petition, which was docketed as 
C-2924, was solicited on the basis of a list of eligible 
employees provided by the District to UTN. That list 
identified the per diem substitute teachers to whom the 
District had given reasonable assurances of continuing 
employment during the 1984-85 school year. 
The petition in C-2924 was not timely and it was withdrawn 
on April 24, 1985. Thereafter, UTN submitted the instant 
petition. It is supported by a showing of interest that is 
based upon the same list of names that was used to collect the 
showing of interest in C-2924. However, on May 24, 1985, 
approximately two weeks before the instant petition was filed, 
the District sent new letters to some of its per diem 
substitute teachers giving them reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment during the 1985-86 school year. Not all 
the per diem substitute teachers who had received such 
assurances for 1984-85 also received them for 1985-86. Some of 
those included in the first but not the second list may have 
received unemployment insurance benefits during the 1985 summer 
vacation. 
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Section 201.7(d) of the Taylor Law provides that 
substitute teachers are covered employees under the Taylor Law 
if they have: 
received a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment in accordance with 
subdivision ten of section five hundred 
~ M^el^^o^^-l^^-a'b^^M^w]^^ 
to disqualify the substitute teacher from 
receiving unemployment insurance benefits . 
It is the position of the District that per diem substitute 
teachers continue to be employees within the meaning of the 
Taylor Law from the time they receive a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment until the District issues new assurances 
which do not include them. Thus, according to the District, 
J those per diem substitute teachers who were issued assurances 
for the 1984-85 but not for the 1985-86 school year ceased 
being covered employees on May 24, 1985. 
The Director rejected this position. In effect, he found 
that per diem substitute teachers who received assurance of 
continuing employment for 1984-85 continued to be covered 
employees throughout that school year regardless of whether 
they received assurances of employment for the 1985-86 school 
year. Thus, inasmuch as the petition was filed during the 
1984-85 school year, the list used by UTN was appropriate.-
Relying upon this list for ascertaining the adequacy of 
i/According to this analysis, it would be irrelevant 
that some of the employees received unemployment insurance 
compensation after the 1984-85 school year. 
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the showing of interest, the Director determined that it was 
numerically sufficient. He ruled, however, that an election, 
when held, would be limited to per diem substitute teachers who 
were employees of the District within the meaning of the Taylor 
Law at the time when the election would be held. 
We decline to consider the District's exceptions insofar 
as they challenge the determination of the Director that the 
2/ 
showing of interest is sufficient.- As we said in Board of 
Education of the City of Yonkers, 10 PERB IPIOO, at 3174 (1977): 
The requirement of a showing of interest is 
to permit this Board to screen out those 
cases in which there is no showing of a 
substantial support of the petitioner by the 
employees, so that public funds will not be 
needlessly expended in the investigation and 
processing of those cases. It is not 
designed to protect an incumbent employee 
organization . . . ..1/ 
Turning to the District's second position, we affirm the 
decision of the Director, on the merits, that UTN's status as 
the representative of the District's regular teachers is not a 
^./Section 201.4(c) of our Rules of Procedure provides: 
The determination by the Director as to the 
timeliness of a showing of interest and of 
its numerical sufficiency is a ministerial 
act and will not be reviewed by the Board. 
3_/See also Matter of CSEA v. Helsbv. 63 Misc. 2d 403, 
3 PERB ir7008 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1970), aff'd, 35 A.D. 2d 
755 (2d Dep't 1970); BOCES of Nassau Co. v. PERB. 15 PERB . -
ir7026 (Nassau Co. 1982), aff'd 99 A.D. 2d 930. 17 PERB ir7006 
(2d Dep't 1984); State of New York. 15 PERB V3014 (1982). 
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reason for disqualifying it from representing the District's 
per diem substitute teachers. The Taylor Law offers no basis 
for preventing a unit of public employees from selecting an 
employee organization to represent it on the ground that such 
employee organization^ already represents another unit of 
4/ 
employees of the same employer.- In this, the Taylor Law 
must be contrasted with §9(b) of the National Labor Relations 
Act and New Jersey Statute 34:13A-513, both of which reflect a 
statutory policy that unions which represent employees 
performing a particular type of work be disqualified from 
representing other employees performing other types of work. 
The District bases its argument to the contrary on Local 
342 v. Helsby. 53 A.D.2d 805, 9 PERB ir7014 (3d Dep' t 1976). 
Reliance on this decision is misplaced. It merely states that 
where there is a conflict of interest between two groups of 
employees, PERB may place them in separate negotiating units. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret ballot 
shall be held under the supervision of the 
Director among the employees in the 
following unit: 
Included: All per diem substitutes who 
have received a reasonable 
assurance of continuing 
employment for the 1985-86 
school year as referenced in 
§201.7(d) of the Civil 
Service Law 
Excluded: All other employees 
4/North Syracuse CSD. 15 PERB 1T3108 (1982). 
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unless UTN submits to the Director 
within 15 days from the date of receipt 
of this decision evidence to satisfy 
the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of our 
rules for certification without an 
election. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that the District shall submit to the 
Director and to UTN within 15 days from 
the date of receipt of this decision an 
alphabetized list of all the employees 
within the unit determined above to be 
appropriate who worked during the 
-
1984-85 school year and who received 
assurance of continuing employment for 
the 1985-86 school year. 
DATED: March 19. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-2970 
A.F.S.C.M.E., Council 35, 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the A.F.S.C.M.E.. Council 35, 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All employees employed in the title of 
Bus Aide. 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the A.F.S.C.M.E., Council 35, 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: March 19, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
CT A r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
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